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Introduction 
The last few years have seen the emergence of a series of regulatory 
initiatives that have been developed, partly in response to the twin agendas of 
human security and strong states, but which represent a specific reaction to 
the political economies deemed to underpin contemporary civil conflicts – 
most notably the way in which local and global markets in everything from 
diamonds to drugs have been exploited to fund often vicious civil conflicts, 
particularly in environments characterised by endemic corruption. This new 
body of local and global regulation, what might loosely be characterised as 
new laws and new codes to address the political economies of the new wars, 
include: UN embargoes on diamonds and timber being used to fund conflicts, 
the development of regimes such as the Kimberley certification system, and 
initiatives to ensure the transparent and effective use of natural resource 
revenues. Generally represented as a progressive response to the political 
economies that drive contemporary civil conflicts, these new initiatives have 
produced a set of formal and informal regulatory frameworks that are, in fact, 
profoundly asymmetric in their scope and application. Indeed, one of the 
defining features of these initiatives is not so much the impartial application of 
regulations to firms and corrupt elites but either their selective application or, 
alternatively, their selective relegation in favour of an emphasis on far weaker 
norms and voluntary codes.  
The aim of this paper then, is first, to examine the operation of the new codes 
and regulations in general and to demonstrate the problems in their 
implementation. Second, the paper will then go onto examine one specific 
innovation – the Kimberley Certification Scheme designed to prevent the trade 
in conflict diamonds in order to demonstrate the asymmetries that exist in 
current regulatory mechanisms designed to introduce ethical markets. It will 
do this in particular by focussing on the impact of certification for the diamond 
sector in Sierra Leone. A key argument in this section will be that whilst this 
new regime for conflict diamonds aims to transform behaviour through 
transparency and policing, and whilst it appears to have had some success, it 
has not in fact transformed the conditions that gave rise to the illicit diamond 
trade in Sierra Leone prior to conflict. Along with the problems inherent in 
broader development policy on Sierra Leone this raises serious questions. In 
particular, whilst there may be little short-term risk of conflict, the planned 
departure of UNAMSIL, continued regional instability, persistent corruption 
and the failure to fundamentally transform the nature of the diamond market in 
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Sierra Leone, all raise question marks regarding the nature (and indeed 
sustainability) of the peace that is being created.   
 
 
 
Ethical Markets and Asymmetric Regulation  
 
Growing concern with the themes of human security (both freedom from fear 
and freedom from want) and state-building have informed a relatively recent 
but growing policy agenda aimed at addressing the dynamics underpinning 
contemporary war-economies and addressing their legacies in peace: the 
regulation of conflict goods, particularly diamonds, anti-bribery initiatives, 
industry codes of conduct etc.  Ostensibly, it is precisely these kinds of 
initiatives that demonstrate how the agendas of human security and state-
building can be combined with free markets in a productive synthesis able to 
combine individual well-being with effective states and to embed ethics into 
the operation of markets.  
In reality however, what has occurred is a project that is asymmetric in its 
effects – it has legitimised quite deep intervention (albeit often ineffective) in 
the governments, societies and informal networks of the poor whilst 
substituting voluntarism and transparency for the regulation of the rich. In 
many ways then, such initiatives stand as the epitome of ‘therapeutic 
governance’1: they offer reassurance that something is being done to address 
the condition of the poor but, in aiming to transform the behaviour of the poor 
without transforming either their conditions or the behaviour of the rich, simply 
end up offering a chimera of effective paternalistic governance. How is this 
so? 
Initiatives on conflict diamonds, on drugs from war-zones, on corruption or on 
ethical trading are situated in a dual discourse about the poor that 
simultaneously embodies them as both sources of threat (through their export 
of terror, crime, disease and indeed people) and also objects of solidarity. 
This double imagining provides both moral purpose and moral cover for a 
range of interventions justified as both expressing solidarity with the poor and 
as protecting the rich world from the backlash of the poor. In contrast, 
however, such initiatives can be more usefully characterised as the 
development of new disciplinary mechanisms that aim to extend the 
monitoring and regulation of the poor as vehicles for their reform.  
A key feature of these initiatives therefore, has been a concern with 
enhancing transparency, not least because the transmission mechanisms of 
anarchy and threat are deemed to be hidden away in the subterranean 
recesses of a globalised world. Thus, the attempt to shed light on the covert, 
the corrupt, the illicit and the flexible shadow networks deemed to underpin 
threat and retard development has been mainstreamed as intrinsic to the 
project of securing against both underdevelopment and the underdeveloped. 
To use a Foucauldian analogy – one might say that the networked capillary 
transactions by which the poor resist their marginalisation have evoked a 
                                                 
1 Vanessa Pupavac, ‘Human Security and the Rise of Global Therapeutic Governance’, Paper for 
Security and Governance Workshop, University of Bristol, 11 Dec 2004, p. 1; Neil Cooper, New Codes 
and New Laws for the New Wars: A Political Economy Approach to the Rule of Law, in  Agnès 
Hurwitz (ed), Rule of Law Programming in Conflict Management. IPA, Forthcoming.  
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reciprocal response – not a panoptican but rather a network of local/global 
panopticans designed to shed light on, and to regulate the ‘black holes of 
global politics’.2  
Underpinning this attempt is the notion that the agents of instability can either 
be embarrassed into changing their behaviour or that ever more information 
can produce ever better regulation and policing. This is not to say that 
transparency does not have an ambiguous role  - for aid supplicants it is 
experienced as a vehicle for embedding external intervention and re-
regulation of societies, albeit intervention aimed at redressing abuse and 
albeit intervention that is largely futile. As far as global markets are concerned 
however, transparency operates more as a substitute for formal regulation 
that mandates a change in behaviour. An example of the former is the IMF’s 
“oil diagnostic” in Angola, agreed as part of a Staff Monitored Program that 
provides the basis for further IFI lending to the country. The diagnostic 
monitors oil revenues to a government that has faced widespread allegations 
over the diversion of public funds to finance arms purchases and the luxury 
lifestyles of senior officials3.The bank has also set out six triggers required to 
determine the award of $200 million staggered credit to Angola. Most of the 
triggers relate to financial transparency and include a 50% reduction in extra-
budgetary and quasi-fiscal outlays and publication of all government revenues 
– the latter to include completion of the oil diagnostic and the movement to 
Banco Nacional de Angola of all oil revenues and their inclusion in the BNA’s 
annual accounts.4
A further example is the model developed in the Chad/Cameroon oil pipeline 
project, a social revenue-sharing agreement between the governments of 
Chad and Cameroon, NGOs, and an international oil consortium, under the 
auspices of the World Bank.  According to the terms of the agreement, the 
Chadian government decreed a petroleum management law in 1998. Under 
the terms of the law, 10% of oil revenues are to be set aside in a future 
generation fund to prepare Chad for a post-oil future; the remainder are to be 
deposited into an offshore escrow account. Of this latter amount, the 
government has committed itself to allocate 80% of its share of oil revenue to 
finance poverty reduction and development and 15% to finance recurrent 
state expenditure. The remaining 5% is earmarked for development in the 
Dhoba oil region.5 To maintain transparency and accountability a “stakeholder 
committee” has been created to monitor income and approve spending.  
The goal of such initiatives, then, in the language of the state-building agenda, 
is to strengthen government and governance whilst in the language of human 
security it is promoting effective management of resources, growth and 
                                                 
2 Joschka Fischer German Foreign Minister, cited in: Daniel Lambach, ‘The International Politics of 
Failing States, paper presented at the International Studies Association Conference, Honolulu, 1-5 
March, 2005, p. 7.  
3 Global Witness, All The President’s Men: The Devastating Story of Oil and Banking in Angola’s 
Privatised War, March, 2002. Available at: www.oneworld.org/globalwitness; Human Rights Watch, 
The Oil Diagnostic in Angola: An Update. A Backgrounder by Human Rights Watch (Washington, 
DC: Human Rights Watch, 2001). 
4 Global Witness et al, Donor commitment to oil revenue transparency and economic governance 
reforms in Angola, 14 February 2005. See: www.oneworld.org/globalwitness; 
5 Phillipe Le Billon, Jake Sherman, and Marcia Hartwell, Controlling Resource Flows to Civil Wars: A 
Review and Analysis of Current Policies and Legal Instruments, New York: IPA, 2002,, 39.  
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freedom from want. But the capacity of these initiatives to effect real 
transformation is limited. In part, this is because the local objects of regulation 
engage in flexible adaptation, often re-working projects of benign paternalism 
in defensive reactions that shore up local power bases. Locals, in effect, 
responded to the projects of external intervention simply by mediating their 
way between the political economies of what Sampson refers to as ‘project 
society’ – the world of NGOs, civil society and development agencies -  and 
‘mafia society’, connecting the two together in the process.6
Thus, the effectiveness of the social revenue sharing agreement almost 
immediately came into question when it was revealed that a November 2000 
purchase of arms had been funded with $4.5 million of a $25 million bonus the 
government received from the oil companies. Moreover, not only has the 
government been criticised for dragging its feet on providing the stakeholder 
committee with facilities, but critics have noted that the allocations contained 
in the law can be changed unilaterally by government after five years and that 
indirect revenues such as taxes and customs duties are not covered. 7   
Similarly, whilst the oil diagnostic in Angola has brought some transparency, 
for instance the publication of a $210 million bonus for the extension of 
ChevronTexaco’s Block O concession in 2004, progress remains flawed. 
Questions remain both about the extent of transparency (Angola continues to 
receive oil-backed loans whose terms remain opaque), and the reliability of 
figures produced through transparency. Indeed, critics have drawn attention to 
the inexplicable way in which higher oil prices appear to have resulted in 
lower tax income.8  
But the problem with the emphasis on local transparency is not merely that 
locals prefer either defensive adaptation or proactive reinvention and 
reincorporation into existing networks of power, patronage, and profit. It is 
also that the push for transparency occurs in a context characterised by the 
absence of local ownership and in transitions to ‘market democracy’ 
characterised by reductions in state subsidies, downward pressure on salaries 
and welfare safety nets, privatisation processes that are easily captured by 
elites and formal elections that increase the pressure for patronage and vote-
buying. Transparency, in this context then, substitutes a concern with the 
transformation of local and global economies in ways likely to build political 
economies of peace and replaces it with a concern with process.  
Moreover, both transparency initiatives and indeed formal regulation of locals 
takes place in a context where regulation to change state and market 
behaviour at the global level is either absent, inadequate or unevenly applied. 
Consequently, the local incentives for domestic actors to mediate their 
existence between project and mafia society are compounded by global 
structures of regulation that provide a remarkably permissive environment for 
both shadow trade and, particularly, the morphing of shadow trade into 
legitimate trade. 
                                                 
6 Steven Sampson, ‘Trouble Spots: Projects, Bandits and State Fragmentation’, in Jonathan Friedman 
(ed), Globalization, The State and Violence, Altamira Press, 2003,  pp. 309-342. 
7 Akong Charles Ndika, ‘A happy Birthday? The Chad/Cameroon Oil pipeline’, Pambazuka news, 
Sept. 23 2004. See: http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/bwi-wto/wbank/2004/0923chadoil.htm 
8 Global Witness et al, Donor commitment to oil revenue transparency and economic governance 
reforms in Angola, 14 February 2005. 
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For instance, external criticism and action against corruption tends, in reality, 
to be correlated with the extent to which states do or do not sign up to 
neoliberalism9 Even more telling perhaps is the use of transparency initiatives 
and codes of conduct as a substitute for global regulation to actually change 
behaviour and transform structures. Thus, there has been a proliferation of 
voluntary industry codes or multilateral guidelines on good practice that rarely 
come with the kind of regulatory teeth that signals a commitment to really 
change behaviour. Examples include: the UN’s Global Compact; the OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance; the Business Principles for Countering 
Bribery in the Engineering and Construction Industry; the ILO Tripartite 
Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social 
Policy; The EU Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade Voluntary 
Partnership scheme; the G8 Declaration on Fighting Corruption and Improving 
Transparency; the Transparency Directive adopted by the EU in 2004;  the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative; and a whole plethora of 
corporate social responsibility initiatives on the part of individual firms.  
The function of such initiatives is not so much to promote ethical markets but 
to head off calls for more rigorous formal regulation. A good example of this 
approach is the Extractive Industries Transparency initiative (EITI). At the 
heart of the EITI is a commitment on the part of extractive companies and 
governments that the payments made to governments should be published. 
The notion is that this will help address the problem of corruption and the risk 
that payments from companies may be diverted to finance war. However, the 
EITI was essentially conceived as an alternative to the more rigorous publish 
what you pay proposals advocated by a coalition of NGOs; its operation has 
allowed a high degree of flexibility to participants in choosing how to actually 
implement their commitments and, as a voluntary initiative, it inevitably omits 
those companies and countries of greatest concern.10 Similarly, membership 
of the Global Compact or commitment to the OECD Principles have not 
prevented firms from engaging in resource exploitation in the conflict in the 
DRC.11 Even where more formal initiatives have been pursued – such as in 
the case of the UN Convention Against Bribery or the Kimberley Certification 
Regime they tend to be characterised by vague or problematic wording of 
texts, poor or no funding for implementation and the provision of weak 
monitoring mechanism. In the case of the current regime on conflict 
diamonds, as will be noted below, actual implementation is also characterised 
by selectivity in application which reflects its role as an instrument of power 
and interest rather than its ostensible role as a vehicle for peace. This reflects 
the asymmetry that exists in the implementation of codes and regulations - 
just as only some odious regimes are the subject of invasion, so only some 
actors are subject to the disciplinary action implied by codes and regulations 
at the global level (see below).   
                                                 
9  Nina Glick Schiller and George Fouron, ‘Killing Me Softly: Violence, Globalization, and the 
Apparent State’, in Jonathan Friedman (ed), Globalization, The State and Violence, op. cit. p. 211-12. 
10 Global Witness and Save the Children, UK, Making it Add Up: A Constructive critique of the EITI 
Reporting Guidelines and Source Book. See: 
http://www.globalwitness.org/reports/show.php/en.00068.html 
11 United Nations, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural 
Resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2002/1146. 
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There is also a second asymmetry that is worth noting and that is the one that 
exists between the regulatory mechanisms established to protect the 
fundamentals of the neoliberal system and the mechanisms established to 
promote ethical markets. Whilst ethical markets are promoted via voluntarism, 
transparency or weak regulation, free markets are promoted via regulation 
that threatens significant sanctions for transgressing the tenets of orthodoxy. 
For instance, in 1999 British Airways was fined £4 million for breaching EU 
competition rules by providing cash incentives to travel agents to encourage 
customers to purchase BA tickets; in 2004 the European Commission 
concluded Microsoft abused its market power in the EU and not only fined it 
€497 million but required it to disclose the interfaces required for their 
products to be able to talk with the Windows system; under WTO rules the EU 
was able to respond to anti-competitive US tax breaks by imposing tariffs on 
US goods amounting to $300 million. Technically, the EU could have 
responded with up to $4 billion of sanctions.12 Of course, even market logic 
and market rights can be constrained by power and interest – hence the 
current debate over US and EU subsidies for agriculture. However, within 
these constraints, the notion that exporting coltan from the conflict in the DRC 
for instance, can be pursued with impunity, whilst offering cash inducements 
to travel agents incurs a £4 million penalty, reflects a key feature of the 
current international rule of markets. 
 
 
Kimberley  
The problems that these various features of global therapeutic governance 
give rise to can be seen in the operation of the regime that has emerged to 
control the trade in conflict diamonds. At the heart of the current regime is the 
Kimberley Certification System that aims to prevent the trade in conflict 
diamonds, as well as a series of UN sanctions against actors exploiting 
diamonds to fund conflict: e.g. UNITA in Angola, the RUF in Sierra Leone. 
Kimberley in particular has emerged as a global agreement covering virtually 
all the diamond-trading nations in the world who in turn have committed 
themselves to a certification system for rough diamonds that aims to prevent 
the diversion of diamonds into the illicit networks that have fuelled civil 
conflict. In many respects, Kimberley stands as an exception to the rule by 
codes that passes for the ethical regulation of global markets. Whilst it is a 
political rather than legal agreement  – it is nevertheless one that appears to 
have teeth – most notably, loss of access to diamond markets for states found 
to be in breach of the agreement. Moreover, WTO requirements on free trade 
were not ultimately allowed to prevent the agreement from coming into being.  
In many respects then, it stands as a model for a more muscular regulation of 
global markets to promote local/global political economies of peace. Yet even 
Kimberley and the broader regime on conflict diamonds displays many of the 
                                                 
12 The Guardian, ‘US Pays China for embassy attack’, 31 July 1999; The Guardian, ‘Cruise line fined 
$18m for dumping waste at sea’, 22 July 1999; The Guardian, ‘BA fined £4 million for illegal trading’, 
15 July 1999; The Guardian, ‘Rip-off firms face big fines’, 9 August, 1999; European Commission 
Press Release: ‘Commission concludes on Microsoft investigations, imposes conduct remedies and a 
fine’, Brussels, 24 March 2004.; The Guardian, ‘Cigarette giant to pay $1 bn to EU’, 6 April 2004; The 
Guardian, ‘EU imposes sanctions on US goods’, March 1 2004. 
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flaws noted above as can be seen by the problems of implementation in 
Sierra Leone and West Africa more broadly.  
Sierra Leone has certainly made progress since the end of its long-running 
civil conflict. Peace has been established, elections have been held  and GDP 
grew by over 6% in both 2002 and 200313  and by a projected 7.2% in 2004.14 
However, by most measures Sierra Leone remains desperately poor. It ranks 
last on the UNDPs Human Development Index, has the lowest purchasing 
power parity, the fourth lowest per capita income in the world (US$140 per 
annum). Its infant (under 5 mortality) is 316/1000, life expectancy at birth is 
only 39 years and debt servicing amounted to 58.3% of export revenue in 
2000.15
Yet since the conclusion of the conflict in Sierra Leone the country has been 
the beneficiary of significant levels of international support. Peace has been 
underpinned by the presence of UNAMSIL, one of the largest ever UN 
peacekeeping forces, which had an annual budget of $750 million in 2001 
(equivalent to Sierra Leone’s annual GDP of $800 million) and, despite 
reductions in its size is still costing $300 million in 2004/2005.16 In addition 
there have been some 60 aid agencies and NGOs who have operated in the 
country with donor funding contributing more than half the national budget.17 
Over the 2000-2004 period the World Bank has provided loans worth 
US$238.62 million for a variety of programmes. Sierra Leone has also 
qualified for the HIPC initiative, despite the fact that it did not have the usual 
track record of economic management normally required. The HIPC Initiative 
provides  some US$600 million in debt relief to the country, amounting to 80% 
of the Net Present Value of its outstanding debt burden. Finally, Sierra Leone 
has been listed as one of the countries who will benefit in the second round of 
debt relief agreed by G8 Finance Ministers.  
In Sierra Leone’s case these initiatives on debt have also been supplemented 
by initiatives that aim to address two interconnected key elements that 
contributed to the country’s slide to conflict – most notably pervasive 
corruption and the role of the illicit diamond trade in funding conflict and 
eroding state revenues.  
 
Corruption 
 
Corruption remains pervasive in Sierra Leone. For instance, a recent World 
Bank Study estimated that 90 to 95% of pharmaceuticals do not make it from 
the central state pharmacy to their intended destinations.18 A survey on the 
perception of corruption in the country conducted in May-August 2000 found 
that 95% of respondents considered corruption to be rampant in most 
                                                 
13 See: 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?SelectedCountry=SLE&CCODE=SLE&CNAME
=Sierra+Leone&PTYPE=CP 
14 PAC, Diamond Industry Annual Review, p. 1. 
15 Barry Riddell, Sierra Leone: Urban-Elite Bias, Atrocity and Debt. Review of African Political 
Economy, Vol. 32, No. 103, March 2005, p. 116.  
16 Malcolm Chalmers, Strengthening Security in failed States, paper presented at a conference on Badly 
Governed and Collapsing States, Yale University, 13-14 May 2005, p. 23.  
17 ICG, Liberia and Sierra Leone: Rebuilding Failed States. 8 Dec 2004, p. 2. 
18 Public Expenditure Tracking Survey Report 2004. 
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government departments. 19  Indeed, the Office of National Security has 
labelled corruption as the primary security threat facing Sierra Leone today 
whilst locals rather more pithily refer to the politics of the country  since 
conflict as “same car, different driver”.20 Indeed, donor concern about the 
level of corruption has been cited as a factor in the postponement of a Donor 
Conference on the Poverty Reduction Strategy, although this has been denied 
by the government.21
This is not to suggest that efforts at externally imposed programmes to 
promote good governance have been absent, quite the reverse in fact. In line 
with the precepts of liberal peace, the government agreed in 2000 to 
implement a National Anti-Corruption Strategy. At the same time, an Anti-
Corruption Commission was established with funding from the UK’s 
Department for International Development (DFID). 22  The latter’s role is to 
investigate those found guilty of breaking anti-corruption laws. It can arrest 
suspects, but lacks the mandate to prosecute. Instead, suspects are handed 
over to the Attorney General, who then determines which cases will proceed.   
However, the operation of both the anti-corruption strategy and the 
commission have suffered from a number of problems. First, to date, the 
government has largely failed to implement the anti-corruption strategy. 
Second, the Attorney General is also the Minister of Justice, leading to 
concerns that the demarcation between the decision to prosecute and the 
political interests of the government is not sufficiently clear.23 Third, as the 
International Crisis Group (ICG) noted in 2002, at least 35 cases brought 
before the Attorney General by the Anti-Corruption Commission have been 
essentially ignored. Indeed, the Commission has been labelled by critics as a 
tool to deter and punish political opponents, “a key instrument of Presidential 
authority rather than an impartial body.” 24  Notably, this echoes previous 
practice in Sierra Leone, in which, for example Strasser used corruption 
investigations focussed on low-level officials as a means of reinforcing his 
authority.25 More broadly, this illustrates the ways in which, despite the best 
intentions of the IFIs, local actors are able to adapt the complex web of 
externally imposed reforms to suit their own political and profit-making 
agendas. It also underscores the way in which externally imposed reforms 
can be simultaneously hobbled by the competing priorities of external actors. 
Thus, donors have been reluctant to comment on the flaws of a Kabbah 
government initially out of fear of jeopardizing the move to elections and now 
out of concern that criticism that could presage a reduction in the UN’s 
peacekeeping force. Viewed from this perspective the current experience of 
                                                 
19 Anti-Corruption Commission 1991. See: www.sierra-leone.org/accreport.html 
20 ICG, Liberia and Sierra Leone, p.  
21, ‘Finance Minister Says Donors Concerned About Sierra Leone Corruption’, Concord Times, 9 June 
2005.  
22 Speech by Clare Short, UK Secretary of State for International Development, at the British Council 
Auditorium, Freetown, Sierra Leone, “Corruption and Governance,” 27 February 2002. 
23 ICG, Sierra Leone After Elections, 16.  
24 Testimony by John Prendergast before House International Relations Committee Africa 
Subcommittee. See: www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects. 
25 Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, 126. 
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donor initiatives to establish good governance in Sierra Leone is one of 
external initiatives meeting local resistance as they come up against a deeply 
ingrained culture of patrimonialism.  
However, it is equally the case that, despite a formal emphasis on poverty 
reduction, anti-corruption initiatives have gone hand in hand with a donor 
emphasis on precisely the kind of neoliberal reforms that local elites were able 
to capture for personal profit prior to the conflict in Sierra Leone particularly 
through manipulation of externally imposed programmes of privatisation and 
deregulation26 and which contributed to wider discontent throughout society. 
The latter for instance was fuelled by reductions in state subsidies for items 
such fuel and rice. Despite this, and in a context where unemployment is still 
high and where the rank-and-file civil service earn an average of a dollar a 
day (equivalent to the UN’s definition of absolute poverty), limits on taxation 
and lower inflation still remain central goals.  Despite the fact that previous 
reforms reduced the number of state-owned firms to 29 and despite the 
manner in which leaders were able to capture the process of privatization, the 
World Bank continues to promote this policy.27 Indeed, in 2001, the Sierra 
Leone government approved the Strategic Plan for the Divestiture of State 
Enterprises and established a National Commission for Privatization to 
support the processes. 28  As in the past, creditors view privatization, 
marketisation and integration into global markets coupled with formal anti-
corruption initiatives, as the way to eliminate corruption and promote 
efficiency, especially in the mining sector.29   
In the short-term at least integration into global markets has resulted in some 
difficult challenges for Sierra Leone and its citizens. For instance, a 30% 
depreciation in the Leone in 2001 led to a dramatic increase in inflation (300% 
in less than two years) with significant rises in the cost of key commodities 
such as petrol, palm oil and rice.30 In January 2005 a one day national strike 
was called.  
The diamond and mineral sector is no exception to these wider problems. A 
number of senior members of the government have reportedly engaged in 
“illicit” diamond mining.31 Closed-door decisions to grant large and long-term 
diamond and oil concessions to foreign companies reflect a continued lack of 
transparency and accountability.32 The practice of privatisation and bringing in 
foreign firms as agents of efficiency has once again been adopted, a process 
aided by external financing for companies. For example, the EU have 
provided $31 million to fund the resumption of mining by the Sierra Rutile 
company whilst the US (via its Overseas Private Investment Company) 
                                                 
26 William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, Boulder CO, Lynne Rienner, 1999; William 
Reno, 'African Weak States and Commercial Alliances', African Affairs, No. 96, 1997, pp. 165-85. 
27 IMF, “IMF Completes Review Under Sierra Leone’s PRGF Arrangement and Approves $25 million 
Disbursement,” Newsbrief No. 02/97, 19 September 2002. 
28 World Bank, Transitional Support Strategy for Sierra Leone, 8. 
29 Ibid., 9. 
30 Jeremy Ginifer, Armed Violence and Poverty in Sierra Leone, p. 18.  
31 ICG, Sierra Leone: Managing Uncertainty, ICG Africa Report no. 35 (ICG: Freetown/Brussels, 24 
Oct. 2001), 11. 
 
32 Ibid. 
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provided $25 million in financing to Sierra Rutile.33 The Canadian mining firm 
DiamondWorks and its subsidiary Branch Energy have also returned to the 
country. DiamondWorks holdings include a 25 year renewable lease on the 
rich kimberlite deposits at Koidu estimated to be worth more than $2 billion. 
Employees of the company have relatively high wages for Sierra Leone and 
Partnership Africa Canada has concluded that information on the 25 year 
lease provided by the company suggest it represents  ‘a very good deal for a 
cash-strapped and investment starved country’.34 Supporters also argue that 
the company has a better record of transparency on its diamond exports than 
local firms. Critics however, have disputed this. The company has also been 
linked to the mercenary companies Sandline and (the now defunct) Executive 
Outcomes (EO). The current head of DiamondWorks, Antonio “Tony” Teixeira, 
was among a number of people named in 2000 by British Foreign Office 
Minister Peter Hain as sanctions busters in Angola35 and his operations in the 
Central African Republic ended in allegations of unpaid taxes.36 Thus, the 
nexus of privatized security purchased on the back of the country’s natural 
resources appears to have extended its legacy into the peace.  
Donors have also responded to the return of endemic corruption in 
government by yet again trying to take government out of the loop. This is in 
spite of the current rhetoric around the importance of building strong states 
and promoting civil society participation. This has two elements to it. First, the 
expansion of donor funding for post-conflict Sierra Leone has also meant an 
expansion of donor influence. In a novel variant of the patrimonialism 
perceived to be at the heart of Sierra Leone’s problems donors 
representatives are now often perceived as patrons and development 
partners as clients. One consequence has been the growing informalisation of 
the relationship between donors and their local counterparts, relationships 
that are often given primacy at the expense of accountability. Thus local 
organizations and public officials that are very close to donor representatives 
are often favoured while other well meaning organizations and sectors are left 
out. Moreover, whilst much lip-service is paid to civil society  - the experience 
of Sierra Leone at least, is that accountability in terms of aid delivery is 
generally upwards to donors rather than downwards to locals –especially 
when it comes to evaluation of aid programmes. 37  External donors, in 
emphasising social capital and the rejuvenating effects of civil society 
influence whilst reserving decision-making on economic fundamentals to 
themselves, are rather like physicians who are not only failing to heal 
themselves but only treating half the patient too.  
The second element is an emphasis on decentralisation. One example of this 
was a DFID project (worth $2,277,442 over 2 years) to restore and reinforce 
Sierra Leone’s paramount chiefs. This has come under sustained criticism for 
both pushing corruption further down the pipeline and for failing to address the 
                                                 
33 Lansana Fofana, ‘Economy-Sierra Leone: Another Round of Mining Difficulties?, Inter Press 
Service News Agency, August 11.  
34 Partnership Africa Canada, Sierra Leone 2004: Diamond Industry Annual review, 2004, p.5 
35 Gberie, War and Peace in Sierra Leone, 19. 
36 Partnership Africa Canada, Sierra Leone 2004: Diamond Industry Annual review, 2004, p.  
37 Transparency International, forthcoming 
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problems in the nature of authority wielded by paramount chiefs.38 Similar 
problems have also been evident in the implementation of the Community 
Development Fund (CDF). The Fund distributes money raised from a tax on 
diamond exports to chiefdoms in mining areas. The aim is to demonstrate to 
the country’s citizens that they have a material interest in supporting the 
official export system for diamonds as opposed to reverting back to the 
unofficial networks that characterized pre-war Sierra Leone. Initially, 
government officials wanted traditional community authorities to design 
specific projects before funding was disbursed, but NGOs and key externals, 
concerned both about state corruption and excessive bureaucratisation of the 
process, insisted the money be disbursed straight away. In the event, few of 
the chiefs actually used the money for the benefit of their communities. 
Instead, opportunities for corruption were simply channelled further down the 
pipeline. For some critics at least, this example highlights the way in which an 
anti-government bias on the part of NGOs and donors, and their perception of 
state officials as uniformly corrupt, can lead to conflict, obstruction, and the 
failure of programs.39  
 
Implementing Kimberley in Sierra Leone and West Africa  
 
Sierra Leone was amongst the pioneers in implementing a diamond 
certification system. Indeed, introduction in Sierra Leone preceded formal 
agreement on the Kimberley Certification Scheme. The latter only being 
agreed in March 2002 with formal implementation beginning in January 2003. 
The country has nevertheless become a participant in this broader system.  
The Kimberley certification scheme consists of four main elements. First, 
there is a requirement for standardized control in producer countries, from 
mine to the point of export. The second, and most widely known element, is a 
certification process in which exported rough diamonds are moved in sealed 
packages and equipped with a Kimberley Process Certificate detailing specific 
data for the diamonds therein (e.g. country of origin, carat weight/mass, 
exporter and importer). In Sierra Leone’s case this is signed by an official in 
the GDD. This is received and documented by customs officials in the 
importing country. Third, a voluntary system of industry warranties aims to 
start with the first import of rough diamonds into a processing country and will 
continue to track them along the supply chain, as long as they remain in their 
rough state. The fourth element is a commitment to the regular publication of 
standardized statistics on production, export, and import. The absence of 
such standardized statistical data in the past has made identification of 
suspicious trading activity difficult. As already noted, in theory at least 
countries failing to comply with the essential elements of the scheme can be 
excluded from trading with participants.40
In many respects implementation of a certification system in Sierra Leone 
would appear to have been relatively successful. Most notably, the value of 
                                                 
38 ICG. Liberia and Sierra Leone, p. 24 
39 Lansana Gberie, War and Peace in Sierra Leone: Diamonds, Corruption and the Lebanese 
Connection, Occasional Paper no. 6 (Ottawa: Partnership Africa Canada, November 2002, 8. 
40 General Accounting Office, International Trade: Critical Issues Remain in Deterring Conflict 
Diamond Trade, GA-02-678 (Washington, DC: GAO, June 2002), p. 18. 
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official diamond exports have risen significantly, from $41 million in 2002 to 
$126 million in 2004 (see table below). This compares with official exports of a 
mere $1.78 million in 1998. Moreover, Sierra Leone’s Gold and Diamond 
Departments is perceived as functioning ‘with a level of transparency and 
professionalism unmatched by other institutions in Sierra Leone’.  
 
Official Sierra Leone Diamond Exports  
 
Year Carats  Value 
2002 351,859 $41,732,130 
2003 506,723 $75,969,751 
2004 691,757 $126,652,634 
 
Source: PAC, Sierra Leone 2005, Diamond Industry Annual Review. p. 4 and 
6 
 
 
 
However, the extent to which such rises in official diamond exports reflect the 
success of certification is debatable. First, better security in the country 
following the establishment of peace has allowed more to return to the mining 
areas resulting in an intensification of mining activities. Second, increased 
worldwide demand may well have helped raise the level of official exports. 
Third, continued UN sanctions on Liberia has reduced the attractions of what 
was a traditional smuggling route for diamonds even prior to the conflict. 
Indeed, UN reports have suggested that sanctions may have led to a reversal 
of trade with Liberian diamonds possibly entering Sierra Leone, although the 
recent civil war has reportedly reduced this flow. Cote d’Ivoire also suspended 
official diamond exports in 2003 as a result of the civil conflict that erupted in 
the country in 2002. However, large scale diamond mining is still underway in 
Cote d’Ivoire with diamonds reportedly being transported to other exporters in 
the region.41At the same time, estimates suggest that a significant proportion 
of local Sierra Leonean diamonds are still being exported illicitly. Estimates of 
smuggling in 2004 ranged from $30 million to as much as $170 million.42
It is thus not clear at the moment exactly how successful certification has 
been for Sierra Leone and how much the increase in official exports reflects 
factors other than the influence of certification. It is certainly the case that the 
illicit diamond sector remains substantial.  
A key test for the effectiveness of diamond certification in Sierra Leone is 
likely to come if and when the UN finally lifts sanctions on the export of 
diamonds from Liberia. The longstanding tradition in Sierra Leone has been 
that informal exports to Liberia fluctuate according to the relative attractions of 
selling in the different markets – as determined by factors such as variations 
in market prices, taxation rates and policies on currency convertibility. If any of 
these factors argue in favour of informal sales to Liberia once sanctions are 
lifted it may prove difficult for Sierra Leone to maintain the current level of 
                                                 
41 Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada, Implementing the Kimberley Process, June 2005, p. 
2.  
42 PAC Sierra Leone 2005, p. 4.  
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official diamond exports.  Any decision to lift sanctions on Liberia therefore 
needs to be made in the context of broader initiatives to harmonise regional 
diamond markets.  
A further concern relates to the focus given by donors to the extractive sector. 
The ICG in particular has criticised the donors for skewed priorities in relation 
to both Sierra Leone and Liberia noting the focus on resource extraction 
displayed by donors compared with agriculture. This is despite the facts that 
agriculture employs 75% of Sierra Leoneans and produces 45% of GDP. For 
instance, agriculture hardly figured in DDR programmes for former 
combatants with training provided for plumbers, carpenters auto mechanics 
etc. In contrast, according to the ICG, whilst ‘agriculture is paid lip service real 
planning seems to focus on resource extraction’.43 Indeed, one might add in 
qualification that real planning in the extractive sector seems focussed around 
attracting external companies – sometimes of dubious repute. Even in the 
alluvial diamond sector some consideration seems to have been given to 
bringing in an outside company to take over large parts of the sector.  Thus, 
ironically, one of the key problems for development in Sierra Leone may well 
be the priority given to reforming the sector deemed to have played such a 
pivotal role in the descent to conflict in Sierra Leone.  
There are however, more fundamental problems that impact on Sierra 
Leone’s implementation of Kimberley and these relate both to the genesis of 
the regime and its focus. Kimberley represented a response by industry and 
government to a threatened boycott of ‘blood diamonds’ by NGOs 
campaigning on the issue. It was thus as much of a defensive measure – 
designed to hang onto markets - as it was a proactive initiative to promote 
peace. Moreover, Kimberley’s evolution is particularly instructive. Whilst the 
Kimberley Process pre-dated the attacks on the World Trade Centre, the 
attitude of the Bush administration in particular, became far more supportive 
in the aftermath of 9/11 and in the context of reports suggesting Al Qaida had 
exploited the trade in conflict diamonds to fund its activities. Kimberley thus 
exhibits a duality. Conceived by a coalition of NGOs and like-minded states as 
an instrument of solidarist global governance, support for it was underpinned 
by its role as an instrument of prophylactic control against money-laundering 
and terror.44 It has also become an instrument for the official diamond industry 
to restrict the much larger informal trade in diamonds from states not in 
conflict.  
Kimberley is also a global mechanism that aims to use transparency as a 
means of disciplining not only the warlords and companies but also the ‘huge 
number of young men [who] still swarm over the alluvial diamond fields of 
Africa…Almost all of them…unregistered and unregulated’45 who participate 
in the illicit trade in rough diamonds. This includes anything from 120 to 
200,000 artisanal diamond miners in Sierra Leone.  
                                                 
43 ICG, Sierra Leone and Liberia, p. 16. 
44 See Chair’s report to Plenary, Kimberley Process Plenary Meeting, Gatineau, Canada, 27-29 October 
2004. Available at: http://www.kimberleyprocess.com:8080/site/?name=home; Chair’s address to the 
13th international jewellery Exhibition, Feb 2005. See: 
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com:8080/site/?name=home 
45 Partnership AfricaCanada and Global Witness, Rich Man Poor Man. Development Diamonds and  
Poverty Diamonds: The Potential for Change in the Artisanal Alluvial Diamonds Fields of Africa, 
2004, p. 5. See: http://pacweb.org/e/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=42&Itemid=65. 
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As already noted this goal is pursued through the development of a scheme to 
monitor and verify the progress of rough diamonds from mine to the point of 
purchase, using a combination of certificates of authenticity covering the trade 
in rough diamonds and a system of voluntary industry warranties 
guaranteeing the ethical content of polished diamonds and jewellery. 
Concomitant with this is a commitment to shed light on diamond industry 
practices. Thus, whilst lighting on the streets of Freetown is still limited the 
Gold and Diamond Department of Sierra Leone attempts to shed light on its 
diamond industry through the provision of regular data on monthly diamond 
exports in terms of caratage and value; a database containing the names, 
addresses and licence numbers (with date of granting) of all diamond 
exporters; a system which requires diamonds to be valued prior to export in 
the full view of Customs and Excise, a senior Mines Monitoring Officer and an 
international Diamond Consultant; and a 40% law under which individuals 
reporting illicit diamond mining receive 40% of the value of any diamonds 
seized. Indeed, the international community have even conducted overflights 
of alluvial diamond areas producing detailed photographs of them to map 
informal diamond activity. Yet despite this, ever more oversight is being urged 
on Sierra Leone.46
At the other end of the diamond chain Belgium, for instance, has now passed 
regulations requiring the four diamond bourses to which most companies 
belong to commission an independent inspector to certify they are meeting 
their obligations under Kimberley. Anti-money laundering laws have also 
restricted cash transactions to Euro 15,000 – facilitating oversight of deals.47 
Indeed, the attempt to restrict cash transactions or other forms of financial 
exchange immune to surveillance is a recurring trend both in specific national 
efforts to curb the illicit diamond trade and more general efforts to curb the 
diverse threats from unregulated disorder – attempts to restrict the Hawallah  
system for instance.  
The aim is to produce a geography of regulation which creates physical or 
bureaucratic nodal points where the capillary networks of global trade and 
transactions are required to converge for the purposes of monitoring and 
control. The focus is on policing and regulating the uncontrolled global 
transmission belts of disorder – the informal activities of the poor, the shadow 
networks of mafia society and the unapproved moral laundering of odious 
transactions that occurs as supply chains cross from the realm of the illicit to 
the realm of the licit. However, local actors adaptively respond to regulation 
either by diversifying supply chains or by diversifying into less regulated 
activities. Estimates suggest that anything between 50 to 90% of Sierra 
Leonean diamonds are still traded unofficially; in Angola $2 million of 
diamonds are smuggled out; the UN has reported that sanctions on Liberia 
may have encouraged cross-border smuggling to Sierra Leone; and a ban on 
trading diamonds for dollars in the DRC simply encouraged a flow of 
diamonds into Angola.48  One example of such adaptation is the fact that 
Mines Monitor Officers in Sierra Leone are not only chronically under-
                                                 
46 Partnership Africa Canada, Sierra Leone 2004: Diamond Industry Annual Review. See: 
http://pacweb.org/e/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=42&Itemid=65 
47 Partnership Africa Canada, The Key to Kimberley: Internal Diamond Controls: Seven Case Studies. 
48 Partnership Africa Canada, The Key to Kimberley: Internal Diamond Controls: Seven case Studies. 
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resourced and under paid ($50 a month) but are often appointed as a function 
of political patronage.  
Even more problematic than this however is the fact that Kimberley is not 
meant to address the fundamentals of poverty, the actual violence and the 
structural inequalities built into the formal diamond trade. What it does 
succeed in doing quite well though, is to reinforce the moral laundering 
process produced by the distancing effects of global supply chains, effectively 
eliminating any illegitimacy that might accrue to the diamond majors and their 
products from the methods of local extraction. It has also provided a form of 
therapeutic reassurance (albeit imaginary) that the supposed potential for 
terrorists to commandeer profits from illicit diamond smuggling has been 
addressed. But it has not substantially changed the terms of trade for the 
diamond diggers, or indeed for most governments in the developing world. 
Thus, most alluvial diamond miners in Africa still earn pitiful wages and work 
in atrocious conditions. For instance, a survey by the Peace Diamonds 
Alliance in Sierra Leone calculated average monthly earning of between $25 
and $30, considerably less than Sierra Leone’s minimum wage of US$40.49 
Such conditions themselves, are of course, an incentive for theft and 
smuggling. Similarly, despite the high values attached to the trade in 
diamonds, for most governments in the developing world the returns from 
diamond exports are not at the kind of level that would support development. 
In part this reflects the structure of the diamond industry and the way value is 
added at subsequent stages of the production process. Thus, retail sales of 
diamond jewellery were worth $57.6 bn in 2000, the trade in polished 
diamonds was worth $12.8 bn, but the global rough diamond trade itself was 
worth only $7.5 bn. It also reflects the fact that exporters in Africa are 
constrained in the level of taxation they can impose by the constant threat of 
informal exports to other competitors. For instance, Sierra Leone raises 
revenue from diamonds via a 3% export tax and various licence fees. After 
deducting for the costs of regulating and managing the licensing system and 
the costs of maintaining Kimberley, net diamond revenue to the government 
has been estimated at less than $3 million for 2004. Indeed, for small scale 
exporters such as neighbouring Liberia, the costs of implementing Kimberley 
is likely to exceed the level of income generated for government.50 Moreover, 
whilst most diamond diggers are Sierra Leonean, most dealers and exporters 
are drawn from the Lebanese business community. Whilst Lebanese diamond 
dealers made a commitment to trade through the official system as a 
contribution to reconstruction after conflict, it is also the fact that capital flight 
has been a persistent feature of Sierra Leone’s political economy and the 
trickle down effect from diamond trade appears to be limited. Indeed, licence 
holders and dealers are now, somewhat ironically, citing the costs of 
Kimberley adherence as a justification for holding wages and diamond prices 
down.  
In theory, Kimberley is supposed to promote peace because it has both a 
policing and a development rationale. On the policing side, the certification 
system established is supposed to prevent the diversion of diamonds to 
rebels. On the development side, certification is supposed to improve 
                                                 
49 PAC, p. 5.  
50 Partnership AfricaCanada and Global Witness, Rich Man Poor Man. Development Diamonds and  
Poverty Diamonds: The Potential for Change in the Artisanal Alluvial Diamonds Fields of Africa, p.6. 
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governance of the diamond sector, increasing resources for development by 
encouraging licit rather than illicit trading and thus raising income from tax etc. 
However, the Kimberley agreement itself has nothing to say on the plight of 
the diggers or the terms of trade for exporting governments. Coupled with the 
appalling working conditions for miners, this has led some critics to call for a 
redefinition of conflict diamonds – to include diamonds that come from areas 
where mining is based on the systematic violation of human rights51 whilst 
others have argued for a greater emphasis on the idea of ‘development 
diamonds’.52  
Of course, it could be argued that Kimberley as originally conceived was 
about preventing the trade in conflict diamonds, not about supporting 
development – but even in its own narrow terms it is problematic. A Kimberley 
certificate does not even guarantee that a diamond is conflict free. Indeed, 
one of Kimberley’s great successes is, ironically, to virtually define conflict 
diamonds out existence. Kimberley defines conflict diamonds by reference to 
the trade of rebel groups and their supporters and also links their definition to 
the fact of there having been UN resolutions covering the particular actors in 
question. In addition, only rough diamonds are covered by the definition.  
Consequently, any number of states have remained free to trade diamonds 
during conflict – the UK during the invasion of Iraq (despite being the location 
for De Beers Central Selling Organisation), Israel, India and Russia for 
instance. In some respects this can be justified on the grounds that the trade 
in diamonds has not been a major factor causing or perpetuating conflict in or 
by these countries, as it was in Sierra Leone or Angola for instance. But even 
where this is the case, a strict reading of Kimberley leaves the determination 
of whether diamonds are conflict diamonds or not as a function of political 
power and interests. For instance, whilst Liberia is now formally at peace, its 
diamonds are (at the time of writing) still subject to UN sanctions pending the 
establishment of a certification system which, as noted above, will likely cost 
more to implement than Liberia will gain from its trade in diamonds. Moreover, 
absent sanctions from the Security Council, Kimberley participants can only 
evaluate the quality of the regulatory and oversight mechanisms designed to 
ensure conflict-free diamonds. Thus the Republic of the Congo (RoC) has 
been expelled from the Kimberley certification scheme, largely as a 
consequence of a substantial illicit diamond trade from the DRC. However, 
the RoC was not actually expelled for trading in conflict diamonds because, 
strictly speaking, there are no conflict diamonds in the DRC. The RoC was 
expelled because it was deemed not to have the regulatory mechanisms in 
place to ensure adherence to Kimberley and will be readmitted once these are 
in place. In essence then, the Kimberley Process has enshrined adherence to 
process as an end in itself rather than addressing the trade in conflict 
diamonds per se.  
Kimberley as it operates today is thus more a simulation of a conflict diamond 
regime than a real conflict diamond regime; one that does not control conflict 
diamonds per se, nor even really the illicit smuggling of diamonds; one that 
does not address the iniquities in terms of trade that really feed 
                                                 
51 Rafael Marques and Rui Falcão de Campos, Lundas – the stones of death Angola’s deadly 
diamonds : Human rights abuses in the Lunda provinces. See: 
http://www.niza.nl/doc/200503141357095990.pdf 
52 Partnership AfricaCanada and Global Witness, Rich Man Poor Man op. cit.  
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underdevelopment and one that does little to address the structural violence 
perpetrated on the diggers. It is a regime that does not aim to provide a cure 
but merely therapy for deeper ills. It provides diamond customers with the 
reassurance that conflict diamonds do not exist – partly because Kimberley 
almost defines them out of existence; it provides the international community 
with a sense of moral purpose in expanding regulatory intervention; it also 
aims to transform the subjectivities of the poor by offering good governance 
as a substitute for structural inequality. It does all these things, but what it 
does not actually do is control diamonds traded in conflicts.  
 
Conclusion 
To conclude, the attempt to address the phenomenon of conflict trade and to 
introduce ethics into the markets of post-conflict societies has produced a 
system of regulation that is asymmetric in its effects and in its coverage. 
Inside the developing world state it is characterised by projects of 
deregulation and re-regulation that aim to transform the behaviour of societies 
without fundamentally transforming their conditions. At the global level, the 
debate about controlling conflict trade and introducing ethics into markets has 
resulted in the selective application of regulations and/or an international rule 
by codes. The effect has been to produce local and global regulatory 
frameworks that are ultimately incapable of transforming the structures and 
relationships that underpin shadow trade, state failure and conflict. At best, 
they operate to embed a mixture of limited global poor relief and extensive 
monitoring and policing geared to preventing the poor re-exporting disorder. 
At worst, they embed inequality and social stresses.  
What does this analysis imply for policy-makers then? A clear lesson of this 
paper is that the proliferation of ever more transparency and ever more local 
regulation without any transformation in the conditions of the poor is unlikely 
to bring durable peace to post-conflict societies. What is needed instead, is a 
shift away from the current mix of ever extending local regulation and 
minimalist global codes implemented within the boundaries of neoliberal 
precepts that foster social stresses. A programme to achieve this would 
require the following: 
First, constructing a system of regulation that is simply designed to make 
markets work better or to mitigate some of their worst effects is insufficient. 
Post-conflict societies in particular, are desperately in need of regulatory 
frameworks underpinned by a commitment to emancipation and to 
transformation. In part, this implies a move away from the selective 
application of regulation and/or its relegation in favour of codes when the 
interests of major powers and key industries are threatened. At the very least, 
this would imply treating Liberia on the same basis as, for instance, the DRC 
– something that is palpably not occurring. Better still this should imply a 
redefinition of conflict diamonds to both cover the trade in polished diamonds 
(which is not currently the case) and to broaden the definition to include 
diamonds that are mined where significant human rights abuse has occurred. 
More generally, there have been calls for the creation of a UN early warning 
system to identify emerging cases of conflict trade. This might also be 
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supplemented by a convention that produces a settled definition of conflict 
trade and sets clear restrictions on the practice.53
However, given the ability of local/global actors to adapt to new geographies 
of regulation, this is unlikely to be sufficient unless the actual content of 
regulation is geared to transforming economic structures and promoting 
development and security. An example might be the way in which NGOs are 
now leading a campaign to restructure the Kimberley certification system. The 
aim is to transform it from a regime that merely provides (ineffectual) policing 
of the problem of conflict diamonds to one that can embed fair labour 
conditions and terms of trade capable of transforming ‘conflict’ or ‘poverty 
diamonds’ into ‘development diamonds’. Another example might be the 
provision of financial support and a favourable regulatory environment for less 
exploitative methods of production such as the workers co-operatives that 
already employ about 100 million people around the world.54 Some funding 
for co-operative mining activities has been provided by externals in Sierra 
Leone and this might be expanded. DFID has also provided funding in Sierra 
Leone for the United Mine Workers Union, although recruitment in the alluvial 
diamond sector is still limited. Again ways of expanding this support might be 
examined within Sierra Leone.  
Second, a local/global political economy of peace will require local/global 
policies of extensive redistribution. At the global level this does not just mean 
increasing aid and abandoning Western tariff barriers on agricultural goods. It 
also implies legislating for initiatives such as the proposed Tobin tax on 
international financial transactions and recognising that for post-conflict 
societies in particular, subsidisation and protection of strategic industries may 
be crucial to sustaining employment and relieving still raw social tensions. In 
the context of Sierra Leone, this suggests the need to both examine better 
forms of protection for local agriculture, particularly rice production and also to 
consider ways in which more of the value added to local diamonds as they 
work their way through the supply chain can be returned to the country. One 
way this could be done would be to use the tracking system established by 
the certification system to generate a Kimberley tax that would fund 
implementation of Kimberley. This is particularly important with respect to the 
provision of support for countries to develop internal mechanisms to better 
ensure the delivery of diamonds from mine to the point of export. This remains 
an issue that countries with large alluvial diamond deposits such as Sierra 
Leone experience particular problems with, and which the Kimberley Process 
has so far done little to address.55 Such funds could also be utilised to provide 
support for cooperatives and for the development of unions. Another 
requirement is for support to develop either local or regionally based cutting 
and polishing facilities so that value can be added locally. The possibility of 
establishing a region-wide diamond bourse has also been examined with 
respect to West Africa and this might also be pursued.  
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54 George Monbiot, ‘A vehicle for equality’, The Guardian, April 12, 2005.  
55 Global Witness and Partnership Afrca Canada, Implementing the Kimberley Process, p. 5. There are 
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implementation of Kimberley, see Le Billon, p. 78. 
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Third, the rhetoric about aid supplicants being allowed to go their own way 
needs to be given more concrete manifestation, not least so that post-conflict 
societies can develop economic models appropriate to local circumstance. 
DFID for instance, has formally abjured linking aid to UK security goals and 
has recently committed itself to cease making aid conditional on the pursuit of 
privatisation and trade liberalisation. 56  In the context of Sierra Leone this 
might imply reconsidering the relationship of the state to external investors 
and the diamond sector more generally. Whilst there are important 
differences, Botswana, for instance, has benefited substantially from its 
diamond industry by rejecting IFI advice and taking a 50% stake in the mining 
operations of De Beers. It also own 10% of De Beers. Consequently, 70% of 
diamond revenue ends up in government coffers.57  
Fourth, policy needs to focus not only on the national dynamics but regional 
dynamics influencing formal and informal economic activity. In the case of 
Sierra Leone, this will require urgent attempts to harmonise (upwards) 
taxation levels and other forms of diamond industry regulation. Operated 
appropriately, such initiatives could benefit governments by generating 
increased revenue whilst also benefiting workers by producing better 
conditions.  
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